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Resumen 
Frente a las afirmaciones de muchos economistas 
neoclásicos, Corea del Sur y Taiwán recurrieron extensamente a la 
protección del mercado interior durante la mayor parte de su 
industrialización desde los años 60. Al igual que Brasil o México, esas 
nuevas economías industriales (NEI) asiáticas usaron la protección en 
los años 50 para sustentar el crecimiento inicial de las industrias 
nacientes. Pero también otorgaron protección a las industrias locales de 
varias maneras novedosas que se apartaron notablemente de la 
estrategia adoptada en América Latina. " 
En Corea del Sur y Taiwan, la protección sirvió para incubar 
sectores exportadores, para fortalecer la competitividad internacional 
de la producción y para diversificar el tejido industrial. Tal pauta 
proteccionista ha demostrado arrojar excelentes resultados. 
Por el contrario, Brasil y México no concedieron la misma 
importancia a los beneficios potenciales del establecimiento de 
sistemas de vinculación entre exportaciones e importaciones (en virtud 
de los cuales sólo las empresas que cumplían ciertos objetivos de 
exportación podían obtener licencias de importación), del subsidio de 
las exportaciones mediante la alta rentabilidad de las ventas en el 
mercado interior y del fortalecimiento de los efectos internos de arrastre 
hacia atrás de los sectores exportadores de bienes duraderos de 
consumo. 
Este trabajo sugiere que la divergencia entre las pautas de 
. industrialización en las NEI asiáticas y latinoamericanas no se debe a 
\ que las segundas recurrieran a la protección y a que las primeras no lo 
hicieran, sino a que ambas zonas aplicaron sistemas de protección 
sustancialmente diferentes. La conclusión principal es que el 
proteccionismo puede estar justificado en los países del Tercer Mundo, 
pero siempre que las barreras a la importación se erijan con miras a 
cumplir objetivos predeterminados en una estrategia integrada de 
desarrollo. 
Palabras clave: industrialización, sustitución de importaciones, 
orientación a la exportación, régfmen comercia), América tatfna, ASia 
oriental. 
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Abstract Contrary to the claims of many neo-c1assical economists, 
South Korea and Taiwan relied heavily on import protection 
throughout their industrialization since the 1960s. Like Brazil and 
Mexico, the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) of East Asia 
used protection on infant industry grounds. But they also provided 
extensive protection to domestic industries in several novel ways 
that substantially departed from the types of strategy implemented 
in Latin America. 
In South Korea and Taiwan, protection was used to incubate'éxport 
sectors, to enhance the competitiveness of production in world 
markets and to diversify the industrial structure. This protectionist 
path has proved to be very successful. 
By contrast, Brazil and Mexico failed to give due consideration to the 
benefits of establishing export-import link systems (under which only 
firms achieving export targets could obtain import Iicenses), of 
subsidizing exports through the high profitability on sales on the 
domestic front and of fostering the internal backward Iinkages of the 
export sectors of consumer durables. 
In this paper, it is argued that the paths of industrialization in the East 
Asian and Latín American NIEs were divergent not because the 
latter used protection and the former did not, buth rather because 
both areas relied on substantially different types of protection. The 
main conclusion is that protectionism may be justified in developing 
countries, but only if import barriers are erected to fulfill 
predetermined objectives in an integrated developmental strategy. 
Keywords: economic geography, industrialization, developing 
countries, import protection, East Asia, Latin America. 
2 
1. Introduction 
The neo-classical explanation of the divergent paths of 
industrialization in East Asia and Latin America has been subjected 
to a considerable challenge (see Gerefti and Wyman, eds., 1990; 
Haggard, 1990). 
i\ieo-c1assical economists, such as B. Balassa, A. C. Harberger, C.-Y. 
Un, G. Ranis and others, and even the World Bank new "market-
friendly" orthodoxy, have suggested that the divergence can be 
accounted for by three main factors: 
(a) the import-substituting industriaiization (iSi) phase has been 
shorter and milder in East Asia than in Latin America; 
(b) the Asian Newly Industrializing Economies (Ai\iIEs), sueh as 
South Korea and Taiwan, undertook in the 1960s a signifieant import 
liberalization program, whieh enabled them to ereate a neutral trade 
.regime and to promote export-Ied growth; 
(e) adjustment policíes to the external shoeks of the 1970s and early 
1980s were orthodox (demand eontraetion, import libera!ization, 
currency devaiuation, ... ) in East Asia, while Latin Ameriea pursued 
policies of debt-driven demand expansion and maintained import 
eontrols and overvalued eurrencies. 
There is certainly scope for extensive argument about these three 
tenets, which may not have an adecuate empirical foundation (see, 
for instance, Bustelo, 1994b). 
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One of the main points of the neo-classical explanation is that the stc 
ANIEs prospered because they did not rely extensively on import pn 
protection. On the contrary, Latin America, the explanation goes on, se 
was unable to undertake import Iiberalization programs and im 
therefore to be competitive in world markets and thus to launch an m 
export-Ied developmental strategy. 
In this paper, it is argued that both East Asia and Latin America did 
rely extensively on import protection and that the divergence in their 
industrialization experiences has to be accounted for by the different 
type or nature of their import protection regimes. 
2. Import Protection in South Korea and Taiwan: Against the 
Mainstream 
Befare dealing with the dynamic contribution of import protection to 
the industrialization drive in South Korea and Taiwan, several 
preliminary aspects should be kept in mind. 
le Firstly, the magnitude of the import liberalization process undertook 
in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1960s has been largely 
exaggerated by neo-classical economists. Extensive research has 
clearly shown that the tariff system remained virtually intact and that 
non-tariff barriers were only partially reformed (Luedde-Neurath, 
1986; Wade, 1990). What is more, this limited import liberalization 
did occur only in those categaries of goods required by the exporters 
(see Haggard and Pang, 1994: 76, for Taiwan; and Kim, 1994: 323-
4, for Korea). 
Secondly, although the resulting average effective protection rate 
was certainly lower than in Latin America, it was not low by the 
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standards of the bulk of developing countries. What is more, import 
protection in the ANIEs during the 1960s and 1970s featured a high 
sectoral dispersion, with very high rates of protection for competitive 
imports in certain consumer durables, intermediate goods, 
machinery and transport equipment (Jenkins, 1991). 
Thirdly, protection continued beyond the ISI phase (1949-58 in 
Taiwan and 1953-64 in Korea) and was peNasive during most of the 
export-oriented industrialization (EOI) periodo In the latter, the 
negative impact of the remaining protection was offset (or'even 
more than balanced out) by massive export incentives to 
manufacturing industry. Al! this amounted to what Gold (1986) has 
called an export-oriented import substitution strategy. A gradual 
import liberalization was embarked upon in the 1980s, mainly as a 
consequence of external pressure and in order to keep open the 
markets of developed countries for their exports (Gwynne, 1990: 
186). Obviously, pressure from the U.S., whose combined trade 
deficit with the four At-JiEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore) amounted to as much as a quarter of its global deficit in 
'\ 1987, obliged currency appreciation and trade liberalization. But the 
latter was not carried out in an indiscriminate fashion. It involved 
mainly the easing of the discretionary import licensing scheme. In 
general, tariffs remained relatively high and other protectionist 
safeguards were retained. Allowance was even made for firms in 
adjustment dífficultíes. In stark contrast with the Latín American 
experience in the 1980s and the transitional economies of Eastern 
Europe in the 1990s (Bustelo, 1994c), trade liberalization was 
gradual and smooth in South Korea and Taiwan. 
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Import Protection during ISI 
During the 1950s. South Korea and Taiwan used import barriers not 
only to protect intant industries, as did many other developing 
countries, but also to incuba te export sectors. 
Even neo-classical economists, such as Corden or Krueger, 
acknowledge that the existence of significant market tailures during 
the learning process of intant industries offers a strong case for 
temporary import protection (Kirkpatrick, 1987: 67). In South Korea 
and Taiwan, infant industries' protection was the main incentive to 
render manufacturing resilient and even internationally competitive. 
Moreover, both the South Korean and Taiwanese governments 
created an export-import link system, under which only firms able to 
achieve export targets could obtain import licenses. In South Korea, 
several currency devaluations (in 1954, 1955 and 1960) preceded 
the large depreciations undertaken in 1961 and 1964 at the outset of 
\the EOI strategy. Furthermore, exporters in both economies were 
granted incentives, such as favourable exchange rates, rebates on 
tariffs, preferential access to long- and short-term credit, and 
reductions on almost all direct and indirect taxes (Alam, 1989: 55-6; 
Westphal, 1990: 47). By these means, the governments urged infant 
industries to pursue an early outward orientation. This use of 
protection as a kind of incubatorfor export sectors contrasts sharply 
with the experience of Latin America, where protection acted as a 
powerful greenhouse, under which inefficient and internationally 
non-competitive industries prospered. 
6 
Import Protection during EOI 
The economic· policies adopted during the EOI phase in the ANIEs 
were in fact a combination of import-substituting and export-oriented 
strategies, which demonstrated to be complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive approaches, contrary to the claims of much 
mainstream literature. As Gereffi has pointed out: 
"import-substituting governments were forced to promote 
exports, and export-promoting governments generally 
controlled imports, in order to earn or conserve scarce foreign 
exchange" (Gereffi, 1990: 233). 
South Korea and Taiwan continued to protect infant industries and 
to promote their outward orientation, but they began to consider two 
additional important objectives of their protectionist path. 
Firstly, protection during the EOI phase was used to enhance the 
competitiveness of production in world markets, through a strategy 
.that Paul Krugman has termed "import protection as export 
promotion" (Krugman, 1984). Import control s (often in the form of 
quotas that set quantitative ceilings on imports, a form of protection 
much disdained by orthodox economists) allowed firms to impose 
high prices on domestic sales, so as to obtain high rates of return for 
goods with a low price-elasticity of demando This high profitability on 
the domestic tront made possible to reduce export prices. As Alice 
Amsden has stTessed for the case of South Korea: 
"if overseas sales were not always profitable ... then the 
government compensated the losers by inflating the returns on 
domestic sales. It did so by imposing trade barriers on imports" 
(Amsden, 1989: 69-70). 
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This kind of protection could be considered as an additional and 
hidden subsidy to exports (Smith. 1991: 11). 
A good but not unique example has been the Korean automobile 
industry which has simultaneously received protection and export 
incentives. In 1995 South Korea's car industry exported more than 
one million units. while import penetration (imports respective to 
domestic demand) was less than 1 percent. 
Secondly. protection during the EOI phase also acted as a dynamic 
tool to diversify the industrial sector. Import controls were imposed 
through a de facto "Iaw of similars". under which an import license 
was only granted if the firm wishing to import could demonstrate that 
the input was not domestically available on reasonable terms. 
Beginning in the mid 1950s. export incentives were extended to 
indirect exporters. that is. manufacturers of capital and intermediate 
goods used in the production of consumer durables for exporto In the 
1970s. South Korea even introduced additional import restrictions in 
j, order to deepen the substitution process towards the heavy and 
\hemical industries (Hel). a drive that has been criticized by the 
World Bank but which seems rather to have been somewhat of a 
success. as Korea has become one of the leading world producers 
in steel and shipbuilding (Auty. 1992). 
Therefore. South Korea and Taiwan used protection during their 
EOI phases as an effective and subtle mechanism to toster the 
internal backward linkages of the rapidly growing export sectors in 
consumer durables (textiles. garments. electronic equipment .... ). As 
a result. they al so achieved success in more capital- and 
technology-intensive industries. such as shipbuilding. steel. 
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petrochemicals, vehicle manufacturing and computers. By contrast, 
many other developing countries (Latin America, India, ... ) failed 
then to give due consideration to the dynamic domestic potential of 
export industries, and often regarded them only as a source of 
foreign exchange in order to finance the imports required by the 
prolongation and deepening of ISI and al so to service the growing 
foreign debt requirements. 
3. Inefficient Protection in Brazil and Mexico 
.. 
By contrast to the ANIEs, Brazil and Mexico did not encourage an 
early outward orientation of infant industries. Their trade strategy 
during the ISI phase did not link import capacities to the 
achievement of export targets. Moreover, their currencies were 
overvalued, in contrast to those of East Asia, and acted as a 
powerful deterrent to exports. Furthermore, their schemes of export 
incentives were created later and were less comprehensive than in 
EastAsia . 
. During the 1950s and almost aH of the 1960s, both Brazil and Mexico 
relied on quantitative restrictions and other import controls. 
However, the protective impact of those measures on infant 
industries and even on the potential exports from those sectors was 
more than offset by an overvalued exchange rateo The first attempt 
to promote exports in import-substituting activities through industrial 
policy was probably the computer sector in Brazilin the late 1970s. It 
has been argued that this case also suggests that infant industry 
promotion through tariff protection, quantitative import restriction 
and administrative measures renders net benefits, as medium- and 
long-term advantages more than counterbalanced its short-term 
costs (Schmitz and Hewitt, 1991). 
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Due to the pressure of foreign exchange earnings, the requirements 
of the deepening of ISI and the use of the exchange rate as an 
anchor to fight inflation, currencies in Brazil and Mexico were 
overvalued. Brazil initiated a crawling-peg policy in 1968 but its 
currency appreciated in real terms during most of the 1970s. Mexico 
adhered during more than 20 years (1954-76) to a fixed nominal 
exchange rate (there was a slight currency appreciation in real 
terms) and did not devaluate unti11976. 
. . 
Finally, Latin America did not begin to promote extensively exports 
of manufactures until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when import 
necessities and debt service urged them to earn foreign exchange. 
In Brazil, tax exemptions and financial credits were granted to export 
firms in the mid-1960s but their impact was rather limited. Some 
relaxation of quantitative restrictions and several tariff cuts were also 
accompanied by an exchange-rate unification and the adoption of a 
crawling pego In the 1970s, Brazil introduced a more comprehensive 
\. export promotion scheme (BEFIES), under which export firms were 
"!~ 
granted tax exemptions, but the external shocks (in the energy, 
trade and capital international markets) prompted new import 
restrictions (Fritsch and Franco, 1994) 
In Mexico, the Certificate of Tax Refund (CEDIS), created in 1971, 
was linked to stringent domestic-content requirements and was 
phased out in 1982. The drawback regime, under which import 
duties on intermediate inputs were refunded to export firms, was 
created in the early 1970s, along with tariff rebates on imported 
inputs for exporting firms, and also short-term export credits 
(FOMEX) and preferential credits for export-oriented investments 
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(FONEI) (Ros, 1994). Moreover, export incentives were not 
extended to indirect exporters, as was the case in East Asia. The 
maqui/adora program, initiated in the mid-1960s, attracted 
substantial investment from the U.S., but was not adequately linked 
to the rest of the domestic economy, in contrast to, for instance, the 
export-processing zones in South Korea (CEPII, 1981). 
There was not in Latin America a wastage-allowance system similar 
to the one created in South Korea and Taiwan, where firms could 
. import more inputs than necessary and sel! the surplus in the 
profitable domestic market. For a comparison of export incentives in 
East Asia and Latin America, see Rhee (1985) and Lejavitzer 
(1985), respectively. 
Several structural factors in the 1950s and 1960s may explain the 
Latin American path: larger domestic markets (which in 1950 were 
11 times larger in Brazil and 8 times larger in Mexico than in 
Taiwan), both for demographic and per cap ita income reasons; 
more foreign exchange earnings, due to much larger primary 
. exports and foreign direct investment; less manufacturing 
competitiveness in world markets, due to high labor costs and timid 
export incentives (Bustelo, 1992 and 1994a: 79-87; Mahon, 1992). 
Land reform in East Asia resulted in a relatively equitable distribution 
of income and promoted an abundant supply for the manufacturing 
sector of surplus worforce, linked to agriculture, through rural-urban 
migration (Korea) or rural manufacturing (Taiwan), containing wage 
!ev.els ando increases. The very \~JÍde dfsse~inati(}n 01 basle 
education al so contributed in the ANlEs to rising productivity levels. It 
has ·beep, convincingly suggested· that 
"comparing Brazil with Taiwan (oo.), what Brazillacked was not 
11 
low wages per se, but the pattern of agricultural landholding, 
rural industrialization, and mass education which alone could 
make low wages compatible with high and fast-rising 
productivity" (Galvao and Tylecote, 1990: 97). 
Nevertheless, Brazil and Mexico were not willing (or able) to institute 
a policy directed to promote an early ouward orientation of the infant 
industries, a real depreciation of the currency and a comprehensive 
scheme of export incentives in manufacturing. 
, , 
4. Conclusions 
In contrast to neo-classical c1aims, both Latin America and East Asia 
relied heavily on import protection during most of their 
industriaiization efforts since the 1950s. 
What counts for the bulk of the divergence in their trade regimes is 
that the nature of import protection was substantially different in both 
areas. While South Korea and Taiwan created in the 1950s an 
.. export-import link system, allowed price discrimination between 
.. 
domestic sales and exports, introduced an eariy scheme of export 
incentives and depreciated their currencíes in real terms, Brazil and 
Mexico used what may be caBed conventionaf import protection. 
They díd nol prom ole exports from infant industries nor, mainly 
because of their appreciated currency, used protection to enhance 
the competitiveness of manufacturing in world markets. Moreover, 
they did not contemplate the dynamic export sector of consumer 
durables as a tool to diversify industry towards more capital- and 
technology-intensive activities. Instead of using selective import 
protection to foster the domestic backward linkages of the outward-
oriented consumer goods' industry, they merely conceived these 
12 
exports as a mean to obtain foreign exchange in order to finance 
imports and to service the foreign debt requirements. 
Orthodox economic theory has dismissed import protection in 
developing countries, mainly because of its generalized anti-export 
bias and its wide and uneven dispersion across sectors. Using both 
import protection and export subsidies (the latter to offset the bias of 
the former) is a double distorsion in neo-c1assical terms. In fact, 
conventional theory argues for import liberalization and easing of 
export incentives. Nevertheless, sorne neo-c1assical econdmists 
have accepted, as a second best, that export promotion may strictly 
conterbalance the negative impact of protection on competitiveness, 
thus creating a neutral trade regime. The experience of South Korea 
and Taiwan tends to suggest that there was not neutrality in the 
trade regime, but instead a pro-export bias, as the effective 
exchange rate for exports has been consistently greater than the 
rate for imports (Bradford, 1991). So, export subsidies may indeed 
not merely offset the anti-export bias of import protection but be 
used al so to create a trade or export-push economy, rather than 
.simplya neutral regime. 
The main conclusion arising from the preceding pages may be laid 
out as follows: import protection may be justified in developing 
countries, but only if import controls are erected in a fully integrated 
developmental strategy. Using insights gained from the experience 
of South Korea and Taiwan, protection may be useful not only to 
promote infant industries, but also to incubate export sectors, to 
enhance internationa! competitiveness and to diversify the industria! 
sector. 
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